Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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Review
Dual process models of clinical reasoning: The central role of knowledge in diagnostic expertise.
Research on diagnostic reasoning has been conducted for fifty years or more. There is growing consensus that there are two distinct processes involved in human diagnostic reasoning: System 1, a rapid retrieval of possible diagnostic hypotheses, largely automatic and based to a large part on experiential knowledge, and System 2, a slower, analytical, conscious application of formal knowledge to arrive at a diagnostic conclusion. However, within this broad framework, controversy and disagreement abound. In particular, many authors have suggested that the root cause of diagnostic errors is cognitive biases originating in System 1 and propose that educating learners about the types of cognitive biases and their impact on diagnosis would have a major influence on error reduction. ⋯ The two processing modes are better understood as a consequence of the nature of the knowledge retrieved, not as independent processes.
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In the context of a major health crisis, health professionals must first compare patients' recovery prospects, thus giving priority to the goal of saving the greatest number of lives. ⋯ The authors' proposed protocol has advantages over the other two protocols due to its greater practicality and capacity to account for egalitarian and consequentialist principles simultaneously. It aims at saving as many lives as possible within the constraints of fairness. Furthermore, the proposed protocol avoids discrimination against people with disabilities without, at the same time, promoting discrimination against the elderly.
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The GRADE system of clinical recommendations has deontic implications and can discriminate between mandatory, prohibited, and merely permitted medical decisions. ⋯ If there is no prima facie evidence that a proposed treatment is harmful, doctors are not negligent in considering it in shared doctor-patient decision-making. But these clinical decisions under uncertainty do not transfer obligations to health authorities, who are not part of the decision-making process in clinical settings. The clinical decision-making process concerns particulars and is guided by contextual and specific reasons that do not fall within the scope of a general policy. Thus, in the context of a serious epidemic in which patients need and demand treatments, if the body of evidence is still changing and fragile, an attitude of tolerance and connivance may ensure a smoother transition to a more stable phase of progress, both in scientific and clinical medicine.
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Numerous studies have demonstrated that our healthcare systems and medical education programs are fundamentally flawed. In North America and Europe, most systems were built upon values and structures that have historically benefitted middle and upper class males of European descent in the global north. As a result, there continue to be systemic biases that are pervasive throughout our healthcare systems and medical education programs. ⋯ In the months leading up to the conference, each writing team explored a specific topic related to clinical reasoning and racial equity. The papers, presented during the virtual conference are now available in this issue of the Journal for the Evaluation of Clinical Practice. In addition, 6 more publications were added to this special topic to showcase new evidence and theory that builds on the recommendations in the three core papers.
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Religious fatalism has for decades been pointed out as a barrier to cancer screening attendance and several studies suggest interventions to decrease fatalism, given its negative impact on the uptake of cancer screening. ⋯ Our main thesis is that interventions do not necessarily have to decrease religious fatalism to increase screening.