Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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Narrative Medicine (NM) and Indigenous Story Medicine both use narrative to understand and effect health, but their respective conceptualizations of narrative differ. ⋯ I call for more scholars to take up different narratives to further investigate the ethical space between NM and Indigenous Story Medicine.
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When one is seriously ill, the diagnosis given can generate questions about what it means and how to make sense of it. This is particularly the case for psychiatric diagnoses which can convey a biomedical narrative of the sufferer's condition. Making sense of one's diagnosis in such cases can involve changing one's self-narrative in such a way as to incorporate the belief that one has developed a disease with an unknown cause. ⋯ I argue that those receiving a psychiatric diagnosis may consequently be vulnerable to epistemic injustice. In particular, this includes hermeneutical injustice, where individuals lack the ability to understand or articulate their experiences in ways that make sense to them, due to their hermeneutical resources being marginalised by the dominant narrative in a medicalized environment. I consider two possible objections to my claim and offer answers to these.
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Digital health technologies: Compounding the existing ethical challenges of the 'right' not to know.
Doctors hold a prima facie duty to respect the autonomy of their patients. This manifests as the patient's 'right' not to know when patients wish to remain unaware of medical information regarding their health, and poses ethical challenges for good medical practice. This paper explores how the emergence of digital health technologies might impact upon the patient's 'right' not to know. ⋯ These digital tools should be designed to include functionality that mitigates these ethical challenges, and allows the preservation of their user's autonomy with regard to the medical information they wish to learn and not learn about.
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One of the criticisms of the operational/diagnostic criteria, generalised since DSM-III, has been that they were shaped solely to achieve the best inter-peer reliability with no considerations for validity. This does not fully reflect reality since throughout the development of the criteria, there was an effort to define and fulfil some validity requirements. However, despite several attempts to create alternative diagnostic systems, there is still a widespread misunderstanding of the epistemological foundations that support this paradigm. ⋯ On the epistemological basis of these operational criteria (OC) the influence of Hempel has been widely discussed. However, the group from St. Louis and, also the DSM-III editors, never openly acknowledged his role and his contribution and revealed other influences such as other medical specialties (that used and validated several OC in the diagnosis of their diseases). On the other hand, contrary to what has often been mentioned there has been a continuous attempt to validate the OC since their conception. In the implementation and development of the operational paradigm, a more instrumental trend was followed, focused on utility, but with successive attempts to achieve realistic validity by searching for biological or psychological causality. The methodologies were initially expert-driven and gradually more data-driven and included some variables external to the construct itself, such as familial aggregation, diagnostic consistency over time, prognostic and other psychometric measures.