Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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The GRADE system of clinical recommendations has deontic implications and can discriminate between mandatory, prohibited, and merely permitted medical decisions. ⋯ If there is no prima facie evidence that a proposed treatment is harmful, doctors are not negligent in considering it in shared doctor-patient decision-making. But these clinical decisions under uncertainty do not transfer obligations to health authorities, who are not part of the decision-making process in clinical settings. The clinical decision-making process concerns particulars and is guided by contextual and specific reasons that do not fall within the scope of a general policy. Thus, in the context of a serious epidemic in which patients need and demand treatments, if the body of evidence is still changing and fragile, an attitude of tolerance and connivance may ensure a smoother transition to a more stable phase of progress, both in scientific and clinical medicine.
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Numerous studies have demonstrated that our healthcare systems and medical education programs are fundamentally flawed. In North America and Europe, most systems were built upon values and structures that have historically benefitted middle and upper class males of European descent in the global north. As a result, there continue to be systemic biases that are pervasive throughout our healthcare systems and medical education programs. ⋯ In the months leading up to the conference, each writing team explored a specific topic related to clinical reasoning and racial equity. The papers, presented during the virtual conference are now available in this issue of the Journal for the Evaluation of Clinical Practice. In addition, 6 more publications were added to this special topic to showcase new evidence and theory that builds on the recommendations in the three core papers.
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Religious fatalism has for decades been pointed out as a barrier to cancer screening attendance and several studies suggest interventions to decrease fatalism, given its negative impact on the uptake of cancer screening. ⋯ Our main thesis is that interventions do not necessarily have to decrease religious fatalism to increase screening.
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When one is seriously ill, the diagnosis given can generate questions about what it means and how to make sense of it. This is particularly the case for psychiatric diagnoses which can convey a biomedical narrative of the sufferer's condition. Making sense of one's diagnosis in such cases can involve changing one's self-narrative in such a way as to incorporate the belief that one has developed a disease with an unknown cause. ⋯ I argue that those receiving a psychiatric diagnosis may consequently be vulnerable to epistemic injustice. In particular, this includes hermeneutical injustice, where individuals lack the ability to understand or articulate their experiences in ways that make sense to them, due to their hermeneutical resources being marginalised by the dominant narrative in a medicalized environment. I consider two possible objections to my claim and offer answers to these.
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Narrative Medicine (NM) and Indigenous Story Medicine both use narrative to understand and effect health, but their respective conceptualizations of narrative differ. ⋯ I call for more scholars to take up different narratives to further investigate the ethical space between NM and Indigenous Story Medicine.