The Journal of medicine and philosophy
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Notwithstanding the question of whether abortion is generally or exceptionally a legitimate means of family planning, it is basically agreed that abortion is not justifiable without free and informed consent of the pregnant woman. However, if abortion is held by the legislature to be a "ground of justification" (i.e., a far-reaching exception to criminal liability), is it true that abortion may also be carried out for the benefit of a pregnant woman who is not able to give free and informed consent? Should a substituted-judgment approach be applied in cases where the woman is incompetent to decide? Or should the pregnant woman's relatives' interests be taken into account exclusively? The author tries to answer these questions, which were tackled by the Austrian Supreme Court in a recent case.
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Dutch euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide stand on the eve of important legal changes. In the summer of 1999, a new government bill concerning euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide was sent to Parliament for discussion. ⋯ Since the approval by the Dutch Senate can be regarded as a formality, it is expected that the bill will come into force in the course of this year (2001). In this paper we discuss these new developments.
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The article calls for a departure from the common concept of autonomy in two significant ways: it argues for the supremacy of semantic understanding over procedure, and claims that clinicians are morally obliged to make a strong effort to persuade patients to accept medical advice. We interpret the value of autonomy as derived from the right persons have to respect, as agents who can argue, persuade and be persuaded in matters of utmost personal significance such as decisions about medical care. ⋯ Understanding suffering to a significant degree is a prerequisite to sincere efforts of persuasion. It is claimed that a modified and pragmatic form of discourse is the necessary framework for understanding suffering and for compassionately interacting with the frail.
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It is often claimed that a clinical investigator may ethically participate (e.g., enroll patients) in a trial only if she is in equipoise (if she has no way to ground a preference for one arm of the study). But this is a serious problem, for as data accumulate, it can be expected that there will be a discernible trend favoring one of the treatments prior to the point where we achieve the trial's objective. ⋯ I argue that Freedman actually puts forth at least two distinct contrasts--one in terms of community vs. individual equipoise, and another concerning clinical vs. theoretical equipoise--and that neither of them resolves the dilemma. I then make a proposal for a more adequate account of how to think about the circumstances under which entering subjects in trials would be justified--a 'sliding-scale equipoise' that arises out of a discussion of patients' values.
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Bioethical decision-making depends on presuppositions about the function and goal of bioethics. The authors in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy share the assumption that bioethics is about resolving cases, not about moral theory, and that the best method of bioethical decision-making is that which produces useful answers. ⋯ The authors consider how the move away from theory and toward actual cases is best accomplished. In particular, the debate in this issue is about specification, specified principlism, and casuistry.