The Journal of medicine and philosophy
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The authority of surrogates-often close family members-to make treatment decisions for previously capacitated patients is said to come from their knowledge of the patient, which they are to draw on as they exercise substituted judgment on the patient's behalf. However, proxy accuracy studies call this authority into question, hence the Patient Preference Predictor (PPP). ⋯ The second is with the assumption that a good decision reproduces the content of that choice. If we are right, then the PPP, helpful though it might be in guiding surrogates' decisions, nevertheless would hold them to the wrong standards and in that way could add to, rather than relieve, the stress they experience as they try to do their job.
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In this paper, I set out two ethical complications for Rid and Wendler's proposal that a "Patient Preference Predictor" (PPP) should be used to aid decision making about incapacitated patients' care. Both of these worries concern how a PPP might categorize patients. ⋯ In the second section, I argue for a more specific--but more contentious--claim that proper respect for the autonomy of incapacitated patients might require us to act on reasons which they could endorse and show how this claim places important limits on the categories employed by an ethically acceptable PPP. The conclusion shows how these concerns about apt categorization relate to more familiar worries about Rid and Wendler's proposals.
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The Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) is intended to improve treatment decision making for incapacitated patients. The PPP would collect information about the treatment preferences of people with different demographic and other characteristics. ⋯ The PPP could be incorporated into existing US law governing treatment for incapacitated patients, although it is unclear whether it would be classified as evidence of a specific patient's preferences or those of a reasonable person sharing certain characteristics with the patient. Ethical concerns about the quality and significance of PPP choices could influence legal decision makers' views of the PPP.
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In his influential 1987 essay, "Equipoise and The Ethics of Randomized Clinical Research," Benjamin Freedman argued that Charles Fried's theoretical equipoise requirement threatened clinical research because it was overwhelmingly fragile and rendered unethical too many randomized clinical trials. Freedman, therefore, proposed an alternative requirement, the clinical equipoise requirement, which is now considered to be the fundamental or guiding principle concerning the ethics of enrolling patients in randomized clinical trials. In this essay I argue that Freedman's clinical equipoise requirement is ambiguous and can be interpreted in (at least) two different ways. I furthermore claim that, ironically, the best interpretation of the clinical equipoise requirement opens Freedman to the same objection that he leveled against Fried twenty-five years ago; namely, that it (Freedman's clinical equipoise requirement) renders unethical too many randomized clinical trials.
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Recent research, especially with functional brain imaging, demonstrated cases where the administration of a placebo produces objective effects in tissues that are indistinguishable from those of the real therapeutic agents. This phenomenon has been shown in treatments of pain, depression, Parkinsonism, and more. ⋯ We claim that the scientific findings bring to a new level the seeming deconstruction of the distinction between "placebo" and "real" drugs, and that instances of placebo treatment which fulfill this criterion should be recognized as a unique category-we call it "comparable placebo treatment" (CPT). The paper uses an analysis of the notion of deception to argue that CPT does not amount to deception; that it can preserve patient autonomy; and that it is therefore morally legitimate.