The Milbank quarterly
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The Milbank quarterly · Sep 2020
Medicare's Bundled Payment Initiatives for Hospital-Initiated Episodes: Evidence and Evolution.
Policy Points Evidence suggests that bundled payment contracting can slow the growth of payer costs relative to fee-for-service contracting, although bundled payment models may not reduce absolute costs. Bundled payments may be more effective than fee-for-service payments in containing costs for certain medical conditions. ⋯ Some evidence suggests a worsening of other quality measures for certain medical conditions. Bundled payment contracting involves trade-offs: Expanding a bundle's scope and duration may better contain costs, but a more comprehensive bundle may be less attractive to providers, reducing their willingness to accept it as an alternative to fee-for-service payment.
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The Milbank quarterly · Sep 2020
Out-of-Network Air Ambulance Bills: Prevalence, Magnitude, and Policy Solutions.
Policy Points Out-of-network air ambulance bills are a type of surprise medical bill and are driven by many of the same market failures behind other surprise medical bills, including patients' inability to choose in-network providers in an emergency or to avoid potential balance billing by out-of-network providers. The financial risk to consumers is high because more than three-quarters of air ambulances are out-of-network and their prices are high and rising. Consumers facing out-of-network air ambulance bills have few legal protections owing to the Airline Deregulation Act's federal preemption of state laws. Any federal policies for surprise medical bills should also address surprise air ambulance bills and should incorporate substantive consumer protections-not just billing transparency-and correct the market distortions for air ambulances.
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The Milbank quarterly · Sep 2020
Savings or Selection? Initial Spending Reductions in the Medicare Shared Savings Program and Considerations for Reform.
Policy Points Concerns have been raised about risk selection in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Specifically, turnover in accountable care organization (ACO) physicians and patient panels has led to concerns that ACOs may be earning shared-savings bonuses by selecting lower-risk patients or providers with lower-risk panels. We find no evidence that changes in ACO patient populations explain savings estimates from previous evaluations through 2015. ⋯ The modest savings and lack of risk selection in the original MSSP design suggest opportunities to build on early progress. Recent program changes provide ACOs with more opportunity to select providers with lower-risk patients. Understanding the effect of these changes will be important for guiding future payment policy.