Bioethics
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In keeping with the pre-eminent status accorded autonomy within Australia, Europe, and the United States, medical practice requires that patients authorize do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders, intended to countermand the default practice in hospitals of instituting cardiopulmonary-resuscitation (CPR) on all patients experiencing cardio-pulmonary arrest. As patients typically do not make these decisions proactively, however, family members are often asked to act as surrogate decision-makers and decide on the patient's behalf. ⋯ Using illustrative examples, we demonstrate that in making decisions about CPR, patients and their families are implicitly required to make moral judgements about the value of the patient's life, including their relationships with significant others. We identify some implications of these empirical observations for the development of ethically appropriate policies and practices regarding patient autonomy and surrogacy at the end of life.
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It is often accepted that we may legitimately speak about voluntary euthanasia only in cases of persons who are suffering because they are incurably injured or have an incurable disease. This article argues that when we consider the moral acceptability of voluntary euthanasia, we have no good reason to concentrate only on persons who are ill or injured and suffering.
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Despite substantial controversy, the use of futility judgments in medicine is quite common, and has been backed by the implementation of hospital policies and professional guidelines on medical futility. The controversy arises when health care professionals (HCPs) consider a treatment futile which patients or families believe to be worthwhile: should HCPs be free to refuse treatments in such a case, or be required to provide them? Most physicians seem convinced that professional autonomy protects them from being forced to provide treatments they judge mentally futile, given the lack of patient benefit as well as the waste of medical resources involved. ⋯ I maintain that none of these versions succeeds in overcoming the standard objection that futility determinations involve value judgments best left to the patients, their designated surrogates, or their families. Nor do resource considerations change this fact, since they should not influence the properly patient-centered judgment about futility.
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Neuroimaging, psychosurgery, deep-brain stimulation, and psychopharmacology hold considerable promise for more accurate prediction and diagnosis and more effective treatment of neurological and psychiatric disorders. Some forms of psychopharmacology may even be able to enhance normal cognitive and affective capacities. ⋯ We need to carefully weigh the potential benefit against the potential harm of such techniques. This paper examines some of these techniques and explores the emerging ethical issues in clinical neuroscience.
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It is increasingly asserted that the disagreements of abstract principle between adversaries in the euthanasia debate fail to account for the complex, particular and ambiguous experiences of people at the end of their lives. A greater research effort into experiences, meaning, connection, vulnerability, and motivation is advocated, during which the euthanasia 'question' should remain open. I argue that this is a normative strategy, which is felicitous to the status quo and further medicalises the end of life, but which masquerades as a value-neutral assertion about needing more knowledge.