Bioethics
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The futility debate may be considered as an effort to provide a clear and justified borderline between physician and patient decision-making authority. In this paper we argue that the search for a definition of futility that provides physicians with a final argument in discussions about life-prolonging treatment, is misplaced. ⋯ A good decision about withholding life-sustaining treatment should be justified from the perspectives of both physician and patient. In this light, a range of definitions of futility is still useful as it can clarify intuitions that a treatment is inappropriate.
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It is both an ethical and legal requirement that patients who participate in clinical trials must generally give their consent. As part of this process, patients must be provided with adequate information to enable them to decide whether or not to take part. In the UK, the pharmaceutical companies that sponsor such research, as well as Local Research Ethics Committees, specify in detail the information that must be given to trial participants. ⋯ However, there were differing views as to the level of information that they felt patients themselves wanted. The researchers did not generally feel that the patients' inability to comprehend information rendered the process of obtaining 'informed consent' a waste of time. However, some did believe that they were required to burden patients with excessive information.
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In recent years philosophers and bioethicists have given considerable attention to the concept of care. Thus we have seen important work on questions such as: whether there is a uniquely female approach to ethics, whether ethics should be partial or impartial, and whether care must be supplemented by justice. ⋯ While all three are kinds of caring, we should not give them similar moral evaluations. Consequently, the distinction between compassion and different kinds of pity gives us an important insight into the question of whether we can consider care a virtue for health care professionals.
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Does respect for autonomy imply respect for precedent autonomy? The principle of respect for autonomy requires us to respect a competent patient's treatment preference, but not everyone agrees that it requires us to respect preferences formed earlier by a now-incapacitated patient, such as those expressed in an advance directive. The concept of precedent autonomy, which concerns just such preferences, is problematic because it is not clear that we can still attribute to a now-incapacitated patient a preference which that patient never disaffirmed but can no longer understand. If we cannot make that attribution, then perhaps we should not respect precedent autonomy--after all, how can you respect patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer want, even if they never disaffirmed those wants? I argue that whether an earlier preference can still be attributed to a now-incapacitated patient depends on the reasons behind the preference, for a preference includes (and is not merely supported by) the reasons behind it. ⋯ In particular, if the considerations that served as reasons for the patient exist only under conditions where the patient retains full mental capacity, then once that capacity is lost, so are those reasons and the preference based upon them. I use this analysis of precedent autonomy to ascertain the merits of various approaches to advance medical decisionmaking, including Nancy Rhoden's approach, approaches based on a Parfitian personal identity analysis, approaches based on soft paternalism, and approaches based on the stability and longevity of preferences. Despite the apparent absurdity of respecting patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer prefer but have never disaffirmed, I conclude with some programmatic remarks on when and why respect for (precedent) autonomy nonetheless requires us to respect former preferences.