Bioethics
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The application of genetic editing techniques for the prevention or cure of disease is a highly promising tool for the future of humanity. However, its implementation contains a number of ethical and legal challenges that should not be underestimated. On this basis, some sectors have already asked for a veto on any intervention that modifies the human germ line, while supporting somatic line editing. ⋯ While doing so, I will provide some examples of the different approaches to germ line editing adopted by different regulations so as to demonstrate that, contrary to what is sometimes stated, a general ban on this practice is not the rule, but the exception. Additionally, I will show how alternative options which currently exist, such as a selective ban based on criteria different to the germ line/somatic line distinction, match better with the need to conciliate research needs and legitimate ethical concerns. Finally, I will introduce some further suggestions to this same purpose.
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Most proponents of conscientious objection accommodation in medicine acknowledge that not all conscientious beliefs can justify refusing service to a patient. Accordingly, they admit that constraints must be placed on the practice of conscientious objection. I argue that one such constraint must be an assessment of the reasonability of the conscientious claim in question, and that this requires normative justification of the claim. ⋯ This generally involves a claim along the lines that conscientious refusals should be permitted to the extent that they do not cause unwarranted harm to the patient. I argue that explaining what would constitute warranted harm requires an explanation of what it is about the conscientious claim that makes the harm warranted. 'Warranted' is a normative operator, and providing this explanation is the same as providing normative justification for the conscientious claim. This shows that resorting to facts about the patient's condition does not avoid the problem of providing normative justification, and that the onus remains on advocates of conscientious objection to provide normative justification for the practice in the context of medical care.
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Solidarity is commonly invoked in the justification of public health care. This is understandable, as calls for and appeals to solidarity are effective in the mobilization of unison action and the willingness to incur sacrifices for others. However, the reference to solidarity as a moral notion requires caution, as there is no agreement on the meaning of solidarity. ⋯ References to universal solidarity obliterate an important distinction between those moral demands that are founded on principles like justice, recognition, or humanity, and those demands that stem from partisan relations in communities. While there is no 'separate essence' of solidarity that could be referred to in order to argue for the conceptual necessity of solidarity's partiality, some features may reasonably be stipulated as being essential to solidarity with a view to its systematic function within moral philosophy. The normative and motivational force of the ties invoked by solidarity is particularly relevant when basic moral demands are not met, and societies are in need of significant forms of communal relatedness.
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There has been a surge in mass media reports extolling the potential for using three-dimensional printing of biomaterials (3D bioprinting) to treat a wide range of clinical conditions. Given that mass media is recognized as one of the most important sources of health and medical information for the general public, especially prospective patients, we report and discuss the ethical consequences of coverage of 3D bioprinting in the media. ⋯ Third, we examine the lack of regulation and absence of discussion about risks associated with bioprinting technology. Fourth, we explore how media misunderstanding is dangerously misleading the narrative about the technology.
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Comment
Conscientious objection, professional duty and compromise: A response to Savulescu and Schuklenk.
In a recent article in this journal, Savulescu and Schuklenk defend and extend their earlier arguments against a right to medical conscientious objection in response to criticisms raised by Cowley. I argue that while it would be preferable to be less accommodating of medical conscientious than many countries currently are, Savulescu and Schuklenk's argument that conscientious objection is 'simply unprofessional' is mistaken. ⋯ Moreover, the fact that conscientious objection appears to involve unjustifiable compromise from the objector's point of view is not a reason for society not to offer that compromise. Arguing for robust enforcement of the no-impediment condition, rather than opposing conscientious objection in principle, may be a more effective way of addressing the harms resulting from an over-permissive conscientious objection policy.