Psychological science
-
Psychological science · Apr 2010
The way you make me feel: evidence for individual differences in affective presence.
How much do individuals consistently influence the way other people feel? Data from 48 work groups suggest there are consistent individual differences both in the emotions that people tend to experience (trait affect) and in the emotions that people tend to elicit in others (trait affective presence). A social relations model analysis revealed that after controlling for emotional contagion, the variance in emotions that people feel is explained by both trait affect (31% of positive affect and 19% of negative affect) and trait affective presence (10% of positive affect and 23% of negative affect). These analyses suggest that affective presence exerts as much influence over interaction partners' negative feelings as does these interaction partners' own trait affect. Positive affective presence correlated with greater network centrality, and negative affective presence correlated with lower agreeableness and greater extraversion.
-
In elections, political preferences are strongly linked to the expectations of the electoral winner-people usually expect their favorite candidate to win. This link could be driven by wishful thinking (a biasing influence of preferences), driven by a biasing influence of expectations on one's wishes, or produced spuriously. To examine these competing possibilities in the 2008 U. ⋯ The findings indicated clear support for wishful thinking: Over time, people's preferences shaped their expectations, but the reverse was not the case. Moreover, these relations were larger among those more strongly identified with their political party and held even when perceptions of general candidate popularity were taken into account. Finally, changes in electoral expectations were consequential, as they shaped disappointment in the electoral results even after taking candidate preferences into account.
-
Psychological science · Aug 2009
The other side of injustice: when unfair procedures increase group-serving behavior.
Greater group identification and higher levels of procedural justice typically work together to encourage group members to engage in group-serving cooperative behavior. However, when people who already identify with a group receive information indicating that the group is procedurally unjust, their motivation to engage in group-serving behavior may increase. ⋯ Study 2 used an implicit measure of group identification and both deliberative and spontaneous measures of group-serving behavior. The findings of both studies support the hypothesis that among people who are highly identified with a group, learning about the group's injustice leads to short-term increases in group-serving behavior.
-
Psychological science · Jul 2009
Common ground and cultural prominence: how conversation reinforces culture.
Why do well-known ideas, practices, and people maintain their cultural prominence in the presence of equally good or better alternatives? This article suggests that a social-psychological process whereby people seek to establish common ground with their conversation partners causes familiar elements of culture to increase in prominence, independently of performance or quality. Two studies tested this hypothesis in the context of professional baseball, showing that common ground predicted the cultural prominence of baseball players better than their performance, even though clear performance metrics are available in this domain. ⋯ Moreover, these conversations mediated the positive link between familiarity and a more institutionalized measure of prominence: All-Star votes (Study 2). Implications for research on the psychological foundations of culture are discussed.
-
Psychological science · Jan 2009
When you and I share perspectives: pronouns modulate perspective taking during narrative comprehension.
Readers mentally simulate the objects and events described in narratives. One common assumption is that readers mentally embody an actor's perspective; alternatively, readers might mentally simulate events from an external "onlooker" perspective. ⋯ Experiment 2, however, found that a short discourse context preceding the event sentence led readers to adopt an external perspective with the pronoun I. These experiments demonstrate that pronoun variation and discourse context mediate the degree of embodiment experienced during narrative comprehension: In all cases, readers mentally simulate objects and events, but they embody an actor's perspective only when directly addressed as the subject of a sentence.