Medical law review
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Although there is no right to abort in English law but rather abortion is a crime, the lawful grounds for which are instantiated in the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990), the regulation of abortion is sometimes perceived as being fairly 'liberal'. Accordingly, the idea that aspects of English law could be criticised under the European Convention on Human Rights, with which the UK must comply following the Human Rights Act 1998, may seem unlikely. ⋯ Further, given the European Court of Human Rights' emphasis on the reduced margin of appreciation once a state has legalised abortion to some degree and its jurisprudence relating to a state's positive obligations, the analysis shows that, while English law may not be problematic in relation to the lack of guidelines relating to the lawful grounds for abortion, it may well be in relation to the lack of a formal system for the review of any two doctors' decision not to grant a termination. Notwithstanding the morally serious nature of the decision to abort, the analysis overall raises questions about the need for at least some degree of abortion law reform, particularly in relation to the first trimester, towards a more autonomy-focused, though time-limited, rights-based approach.
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In this article, I argue that sexual exploitation in the doctor-patient relationship would be dealt with more appropriately by the law in England and Wales on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty. Three different types of sexual boundary breaches are discussed, and the particular focus is on breaches where the patient's consent is obtained through inducement. I contend that current avenues of redress do not clearly catch this behaviour and, moreover, they fail to capture the essence of the wrong committed by the doctor-the knowing breach of trust for self-gain-and the calculated way in which consent is induced. Finally, I demonstrate that the fiduciary approach is compatible with the contemporary pro-patient autonomy model of the doctor-patient relationship.
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Under the Irish Constitution abortion is allowed only where the life of the pregnant woman is at risk. The provision in question, Article 40.3.3 (or the 8th Amendment) has long been criticised for failing to respect women's autonomy, and in Mellet v Ireland, the UN Human Rights Committee found that Amanda Jane Mellet, who travelled to Liverpool to access abortion following a finding that her foetus suffered a fatal abnormality, had suffered a violation of her rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). ⋯ Rather, the Committee's decision illustrates the suffering that all women in Ireland who travel to access abortion experience, arguably constituting a violation of their right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. On that reading, Mellet signifies the need to implement a comprehensive rethink of Irish abortion law including, but going beyond, access to abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality.
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The central issue of the Court of Appeal decision in R (Tracey) v Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 822 concerned whether competent adults should be involved in the decision-making process for Do Not Attempt Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR) decisions. These are sensitive decisions made on the basis that cardio-pulmonary resuscitation would be futile, or that efforts to resuscitate would not be in the best clinical interests of the person concerned. The Court held that patient involvement in DNACPR decisions should be the presumption, even if clinicians sincerely believed that resuscitation would be futile, unless that involvement would cause actual psychological or physical harm. This case commentary explores the potential implications of this decision in the context of contemporary healthcare.