Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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Overdiagnosis refers to diagnosis that does not benefit patients because the diagnosed condition is not a harmful disease in those individuals. Overdiagnosis has been identified as a problem in cancer screening, diseases such as chronic kidney disease and diabetes, and a range of mental illnesses including depression and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. In this paper, we describe overdiagnosis, investigate reasons why it occurs, and propose two different types. ⋯ Maldetection overdiagnosis arises because, at the time the diagnosis is made and despite the presence of a 'gold standard' diagnostic test, it is not possible to discriminate between harmful and non-harmful cases of the index disease. We illustrate maldetection overdiagnosis using the example of thyroid cancer. While there is some overlap between misclassification and maldetection overdiagnosis, this conceptual analysis helps to clarify the phenomenon of overdiagnosis and is a necessary first step in developing strategies to address the problem.
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Evidence-based health care (EBHC) has consistently been attacked by opponents for being perniciously reductive. Although these attacks are overwhelmingly framed as critiques of evidence-based medicine, they standardly target the research wing of EBHC upon which evidence-based medicine is dependent, and increasingly extend to adjacent health care disciplines, such as nursing. One of the most persistent forms this line of attack has taken is the allegation that EBHC, with its emphasis on the hierarchy of evidence, grounded in the use of randomized controlled trials, and the clinical guidelines developed on their basis, fails to recognize the patient as the complex self she is, treating her instead as merely a quantifiable, medical-scientific object. ⋯ Review of these critiques suggests they can be categorized into two groups: soft critiques and strong critiques. Soft critiques tend to take a more measured tone grounded in empirical concerns about the dangers of an evidence-based approach to health care, whereas strong critiques tend to make sweeping claims grounded in theoretical commitments to anti-foundationalist philosophical frameworks. While both soft and strong critiques ultimately fail to make the case that EBHC has no room for the self, the empirical concerns of soft critiques nevertheless present a challenge EBHC advocates would do well to take seriously and address.
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Ontology is involved in medical care, because what both doctors and patients think the disease, the patient and the doctor are affects the giving and receiving of care, and hence the definition of medical care as profession. Going back to ancient philosophical views of disease as 'bounded entity' or as 'relation' (still echoed in contemporary theories and mindsets), I propose a way to think ontologically about disease that places it in necessary connection with the patient as person. Drawing on Augustine's views on disease, bodily integrity, and the human person as mind-body unit, I speak of 'monistic dualism' as the view where the unit and health of the person is continuously and personally generated by the mind's attention to and action on the body, whether the body is impaired or not. ⋯ This 'metaphysical body' is termed 'the body electric' in patients, and I argue that clinicians can attend properly to the diseased body by attending to patients' metaphysical body. As clinicians offer metaphysical care to themselves, employing monistic dualism to create their metaphysical body, they should not deny it to patients. Ontology cannot be part of medical care without making metaphysical care a requirement.
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Since its inception in the early 1990s, evidence-based medicine (EBM) has become the dominant epistemic framework for Western medical practice. However, in light of powerful criticisms against EBM, alternatives such as casuistic medicine have been gaining support in both the medical and philosophical community. In the absence of empirical evidence in support of the claim that EBM improves patient outcomes, and in light of considerations that it is unlikely that such evidence will be forthcoming, another standard is needed to assess EBM against its alternatives. ⋯ I then apply these criteria to assess EBM against a casuistic framework for medical knowledge. I argue that EBM's strict adherence to a hierarchical organization of knowledge can reasonably be expected to block it from fulfilling a high level of objectivity. A casuistic framework, on the other hand, because it emphasizes critical evaluation in conjunction with the flexibility of a case-based approach, could be expected to better facilitate a more optimal epistemic community.