Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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Comment
How to make a particular case for person-centred patient care: A commentary on Alexandra Parvan.
In recent years, a person-centred approach to patient care in cases of mental illness has been promoted as an alternative to a disease orientated approach. Alexandra Parvan's contribution to the person-centred approach serves to motivate an exploration of the approach's most apt metaphysical assumptions. I argue that a metaphysical thesis or assumption about both persons and their uniqueness is an essential element of being person-centred. I apply the assumption to issues such as the disorder/disease distinction and to the continuity of mental health and illness.
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Medical scientists have expressed scepticism about whether philosophy is relevant to medicine. We challenged this in a conference on the topic of "too much medicine" (TMM) held in Oxford in April 2017. The topic of TMM provided an opportunity to bring the two disciplines together because of its history both in philosophy and in medicine. ⋯ First, both disciplines had to avoid discipline-specific jargon. Second, each discipline had to engage with the other. Specifically, medical scientists had to engage with some philosophical literature, and philosophers had to "get their hands dirty with data." In this conference report, we provide an overview of our discussions and summarize the other papers in the series.