Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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Since its foundation in 2010, the annual philosophy thematic edition of this journal has been a forum for authors from a wide range of disciplines and backgrounds, enabling contributors to raise questions of an urgent and fundamental nature regarding the most pressing problems facing the delivery and organization of healthcare. Authors have successfully exposed and challenged underlying assumptions that framed professional and policy discourse in diverse areas, generating productive and insightful dialogue regarding the relationship between evidence, value, clinical research and practice. These lively debates continue in this thematic edition, which includes a special section on stigma, shame and respect in healthcare. ⋯ Papers examine the lived experience of discreditation, discrimination and degradation in a range of contexts, from the labour room to mental healthcare and the treatment of 'deviancy' and 'looked-after children'. Authors raise challenging questions about the development of our uses of language in the context of care, and the relationship between stigma, disrespect and important analyses of power asymmetry and epistemic injustice. The relationship between respect, autonomy and personhood is explored with reference to contributions from an important conference series, which includes analyses of shame in the context of medically unexplained illness, humour, humiliation and obstetric violence.
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Evidence-Based Medicine proposes a prescriptive model of physician decision-making in which 'best evidence' is used to guide best practice. And yet, proponents of EBM acknowledge that EBM fails to offer a systematic theory of physician decision-making. ⋯ Physicians are required to interpret and apply any knowledge-even what EBM would term 'best evidence'-in light of their own knowledge, background and experience. This is consequential for EBM as understanding what physicians do and why they do it would appear to be essential to achieving optimal practice in accordance with best evidence.
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Patient-centered care is considered a vital component of good quality care for breast cancer patients. Nevertheless, the implementation of this valuable concept in clinical practice appears to be difficult. The goal of this study is to bridge the gap between theoretical elaboration of "patient-centered care" and clinical practice. To that purpose, a scoping analysis was performed of the application of the term "patient-centered care in breast cancer treatment" in present-day literature. ⋯ We propose, contrary to previous efforts to define "patient-centered care" more accurately, to embrace the heterogeneity of the concept and apply "patient-centered care" as an umbrella-term for all healthcare that intends to contribute to the acknowledgement of the person in the patient. For the justification of measures to realize patient-centered care for breast cancer patients, instead of a mere contribution to the abstract concept, we insist on the demonstration of desirable real-world effects.
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Both in medicine and in psychiatry, it's essential to find a general definition for medical and mental disorders. For this we have to analyze the concepts behind these definitions. In this article, we intend to review the proximity between the concepts of mental and medical disorders regarding the presence of values, and to propose a way to deal with the different kinds of values that might be present. ⋯ It is concluded that values are present in the main concepts that have been used to define medical or mental disorder. What is essential is to understand what is descriptive and what is value and to try to avoid moral values in this context.
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Some have questioned the extent of medical intervention at the end of people's lives, arguing that we often intervene in the dying process in ways which are harmful, inappropriate, or undignified. In this paper, I argue that over-treatment of dying is a function of the way in which clinicians manage epistemic risk-the risk of being wrong. When making any scientific decision-whether making inferences from empirical data, or determining a plan for medical treatment-there is always a degree of uncertainty: in other words, there is always a possibility we make the wrong decision. ⋯ Having outlined where and how epistemic risk arises in end-of-life care, I turn my attention to the values and norms which shape clinicians' management of epistemic risk. I highlight how societal attitudes towards death, the medicalisation of dying, and the practice of defensive medicine all contribute to clinicians erring on one side of epistemic caution, minimising the risk that they miss or fail to treat illness. By applying the concept of epistemic risk to end-of-life care, I offer a novel lens through which to view medical decision-making in dying patients.