Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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Evidence-Based Medicine proposes a prescriptive model of physician decision-making in which 'best evidence' is used to guide best practice. And yet, proponents of EBM acknowledge that EBM fails to offer a systematic theory of physician decision-making. ⋯ Physicians are required to interpret and apply any knowledge-even what EBM would term 'best evidence'-in light of their own knowledge, background and experience. This is consequential for EBM as understanding what physicians do and why they do it would appear to be essential to achieving optimal practice in accordance with best evidence.
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Patient-centered care is considered a vital component of good quality care for breast cancer patients. Nevertheless, the implementation of this valuable concept in clinical practice appears to be difficult. The goal of this study is to bridge the gap between theoretical elaboration of "patient-centered care" and clinical practice. To that purpose, a scoping analysis was performed of the application of the term "patient-centered care in breast cancer treatment" in present-day literature. ⋯ We propose, contrary to previous efforts to define "patient-centered care" more accurately, to embrace the heterogeneity of the concept and apply "patient-centered care" as an umbrella-term for all healthcare that intends to contribute to the acknowledgement of the person in the patient. For the justification of measures to realize patient-centered care for breast cancer patients, instead of a mere contribution to the abstract concept, we insist on the demonstration of desirable real-world effects.
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Both in medicine and in psychiatry, it's essential to find a general definition for medical and mental disorders. For this we have to analyze the concepts behind these definitions. In this article, we intend to review the proximity between the concepts of mental and medical disorders regarding the presence of values, and to propose a way to deal with the different kinds of values that might be present. ⋯ It is concluded that values are present in the main concepts that have been used to define medical or mental disorder. What is essential is to understand what is descriptive and what is value and to try to avoid moral values in this context.
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Some have questioned the extent of medical intervention at the end of people's lives, arguing that we often intervene in the dying process in ways which are harmful, inappropriate, or undignified. In this paper, I argue that over-treatment of dying is a function of the way in which clinicians manage epistemic risk-the risk of being wrong. When making any scientific decision-whether making inferences from empirical data, or determining a plan for medical treatment-there is always a degree of uncertainty: in other words, there is always a possibility we make the wrong decision. ⋯ Having outlined where and how epistemic risk arises in end-of-life care, I turn my attention to the values and norms which shape clinicians' management of epistemic risk. I highlight how societal attitudes towards death, the medicalisation of dying, and the practice of defensive medicine all contribute to clinicians erring on one side of epistemic caution, minimising the risk that they miss or fail to treat illness. By applying the concept of epistemic risk to end-of-life care, I offer a novel lens through which to view medical decision-making in dying patients.
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There are thousands of papers about stigma, for instance about stigma's impact on wellbeing, mental or physical health. But the definition of stigma has received only modest attention. In "Conceptualizing stigma" from 2001, Link and Phelan offer a thorough and detailed definition of stigma. They suggest that there are six necessary conditions for stigma, namely labelled differences, stereotypes, separation, status loss and discrimination, power, and emotional reaction. This definition is widely applied in the literature but is left mainly uncriticized. ⋯ We suggest that groups, not individuals, are the target of stigma, though it is individuals who may be the victims of it. We suggest a revised definition of stigma that is more simple, precise, and consistent with the empirical literature on stigma; there is stigma if and only if there is labelling, negative stereotyping, linguistic separation, and power asymmetry.