Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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The evidentiary standards and epistemic models of clinical care, especially those of evidence-based medicine, are dissimilar to those used in philosophy and examination of how the two systems intersect may help clinicians make more informed treatment decisions. ⋯ We find that the medical establishment should embrace ethical evaluation as intrinsic to medical practice and that medical training and treatment guidelines should reflect this reality. Patients deserve clarity and transparency about how physicians make determinations about their treatment, and physicians should be prepared to offer explanations for those decisions.
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Since non-directed (altruistic) kidney donors do not stand to benefit from the lengthening and strengthening of a relationship that they intrinsically value, their donations are considered to constitute the most altruistic variety of living kidney donation. ⋯ Accordingly, the expected value of becoming a living kidney donor is likely to be positive, meaning the act of doing so may be considered akin to the taking out of an insurance policy. In the context of non-directed (altruistic) kidney donation, this may diminish the extent to which such a donation is considered altruistic.
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Despite the at least decades long record of philosophical recognition and interest, the intricacy of the deceptively familiar appearing concepts of 'disease', 'disorder', 'disability', and so forth, has only recently begun showing itself with clarity in the popular discourse wherein its newly emerging prominence stems from the liberties and restrictions contingent upon it. Whether a person is deemed to be afflicted by a disease or a disorder governs their ability to access health care, be it free at the point of use or provided by an insurer; it also influences the treatment of individuals by the judicial system and employers; it even affects one's own perception of self. ⋯ Using a series of presently contentious cases illustrate the power of the proposed framework which is capable of providing actionable and humane solutions to problems that leave the current theories confounded.
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There are high hopes that clinical decisions can be improved by adopting algorithms trained to estimate the likelihood that a patient suffers a condition C. Introducing work on the epistemic value of purely statistical evidence in legal epistemology I show that a certain type of AI devices for making medical decisions about persons rely on purely statistical evidence and that it raises an important question about the appropriateness of relying on such devices for allocating health resources. If the argument I present is sound, then it suggests a radical rethinking of the use of prevalent types of AI devices as well as the use of statistical evidence in medical practice more generally.