Frontiers in psychology
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Frontiers in psychology · Jan 2015
Me, myself, and I: self-referent word use as an indicator of self-focused attention in relation to depression and anxiety.
Self-focused attention (SFA) is considered a cognitive bias that is closely related to depression. However, it is not yet well understood whether it represents a disorder-specific or a trans-diagnostic phenomenon and which role the valence of a given context is playing in this regard. Computerized quantitative text-analysis offers an integrative psycho-linguistic approach that may help to provide new insights into these complex relationships. ⋯ However, non-chronically depressed patients used more first-person singular pronouns than healthy controls, irrespective of context. Taken together, the findings lend partial support to theoretical models that emphasize the effects of context on self-focus and consider SFA as a relevant trans-diagnostic phenomenon. In addition, the present findings point to the construct validity of pronoun-use as a linguistic marker of maladaptive self-focus.
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Frontiers in psychology · Jan 2015
Autobiographical memory and hyperassociativity in the dreaming brain: implications for memory consolidation in sleep.
In this paper we argue that autobiographical memory (AM) activity across sleep and wake can provide insight into the nature of dreaming, and vice versa. Activated memories within the sleeping brain reflect one's personal life history (autobiography). They can appear in largely fragmentary forms and differ from conventional manifestations of episodic memory. ⋯ The constructive nature of autobiographical recall further encourages synthesis of these hyper-associated images into an episode via recalling and reporting dreams. We use a model of AM to account for the activation of memories in dreams as a reflection of sleep-dependent memory consolidation processes. We focus in particular on the hyperassociative nature of AM during sleep.
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Frontiers in psychology · Jan 2015
Words putting pain in motion: the generalization of pain-related fear within an artificial stimulus category.
Patients with chronic pain are often fearful of movements that never featured in painful episodes. This study examined whether a neutral movement's conceptual relationship with pain-relevant stimuli could precipitate pain-related fear; a process known as symbolic generalization. As a secondary objective, we also compared experiential and verbal fear learning in the generalization of pain-related fear. ⋯ The results showed that movements equivalent to the pain-relevant nonsense words evoked heightened pain-related fear as measured by pain-US expectancy, fear of pain, and unpleasantness ratings. Also, experience with the pain-US evinced stronger acquisition and generalization compared to experience with threatening information. The clinical importance and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.
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Frontiers in psychology · Jan 2015
Psychometric properties of the multidimensional assessment of interoceptive awareness (MAIA) in a Chilean population.
The multidimensional assessment of interoceptive awareness (MAIA) is an instrument designed to assess interoceptive awareness. The aim of this study was to adapt the original MAIA scale to Spanish and to analyze its psychometric properties in a Chilean population. The MAIA was administered to 470 adults, aged 18-70 years, 76.6% women and 23.4% men, residents of the provinces of Valparaíso and Concepción, Chile. ⋯ The Spanish version showed appropriate indicators of construct validity and reliability, with a Cronbach's α of 0.90 for the total scale, and values between 0.40 and 0.86 for the different subscales. Similar to previous studies, low reliability was observed in two of the eight scales (Not-Distracting and Not-Worrying), thus further revision of these subscales is suggested. The Spanish version of MAIA proved to be a valid and reliable tool to investigate interoceptive awareness in the Chilean population.
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Frontiers in psychology · Jan 2015
Is experiential-intuitive cognitive style more inclined to err on conjunction fallacy than analytical-rational cognitive style?
In terms of prediction by Epstein's integrative theory of personality, cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), those people with experiential-intuitive cognitive style are more inclined to induce errors than the other people with analytical-rational cognitive style in the conjunction fallacy (two events that can occur together are seen as more likely than at least one of the two events). We tested this prediction in a revised Linda problem. The results revealed that rational and experiential cognitive styles do not statistically influence the propensity for committing the conjunction fallacy, which is contrary to the CEST's predictions. Based on the assumption that the rational vs. experiential processing is a personality trait with comparatively stabile specialities, these findings preliminarily indicate that those people who are characterized by "rational thinking" are not more inclined to use Bayes' deduction than the other people who are labeled by "intuitive thinking" or by "poor thinking."