The journal of pain : official journal of the American Pain Society
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Review Historical Article
The infancy of infant pain research: the experimental origins of infant pain denial.
Skepticism toward infant pain characterized much of 20th century research and clinical practice, with infant surgery routinely conducted with minimal or no anesthesia into the 1980s. This paper offers a historical exploration of how this view became common by reviewing and analyzing the experimental infant pain research of the 19th and early 20th centuries that contributed to the development of infant pain denial. These experiments used pinprick and electric shock, and the results were generally interpreted as evidence of infants' underdeveloped pain perception, attributed to their lack of brain maturation. Even clear responses to noxious stimuli were often dismissed as reflex responding. Later these experimental findings were used by anesthesiologists to support the lessened use of anesthesia for infants. Based on the reviewed literature, this paper suggests that 4 interrelated causes contributed to the denial of infant pain: the Darwinian view of the child as a lower being, extreme experimental caution, the mechanistic behaviorist perspective, and an increasing emphasis on brain and nervous system development. Ultimately this history can be read as a caution to modern researchers to be aware of their own biases, the risks of null hypothesis testing, and a purely mechanistic view of infants. ⋯ This article reviews the history of 19th and early 20th century infant pain research, tracing how the widely accepted belief that infants could not feel pain developed in the period prior to the growing acceptance of infant pain. Four interrelated causes are posited to help explain the tolerance of infant pain denial until recent times.
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Arguments made for the advantages of replacing pain ratings with brain-imaging data include assumptions that pain ratings are less reliable and objective and that brain image data would greatly benefit the measurement of treatment efficacy. None of these assumptions are supported by available evidence. Self-report of pain is predictable and does not necessarily reflect unreliability or error. Because pain is defined as an experience, magnitudes of its dimensions can be estimated by well-established methods, including those used to validate brain imaging of pain. Brain imaging helps to study pain mechanisms and might be used as proxy measures of pain in persons unable to provide verbal reports. Yet eliminating pain ratings or replacing them with neuroimaging data is misguided because brain images only help explain pain if they are used in conjunction with self-report. There is no objective readout mechanism of pain (pain thermometer) that is unaffected by psychological factors. Benefits from including neuroimaging data might include increased understanding of underlying neural mechanisms of treatment efficacy, discovery of new treatment vectors, and support of conclusions derived from self-report. However, neither brain imaging nor self-report data are privileged over the other. The assumption that treatment efficacy is hampered by self-report has not been shown; there is a plethora of treatment studies showing that self-report is sensitive to treatment. Dismissal of patients' self-reports (pain ratings) by brain-imaging data is potentially harmful. The aim of replacing self-report with brain-imaging data is misguided and has no scientific or philosophical foundation. ⋯ Although brain imaging may offer considerable insight into the neural mechanisms of pain, including relevant causes and correlations, brain images cannot and should not replace self-report. Only the latter assesses the experience of pain, which is not identical to neural activity. Brain imaging may help to explain pain, but replacing self-report with brain-imaging data would be philosophically and scientifically misguided and potentially harmful to pain patients.