• Eleanor Alexandra Byrne.
• Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, UK. eleanor.byrne@york.ac.uk.
• Med Health Care Philos. 2020 Sep 1; 23 (3): 371-379.

AbstractMiranda Fricker's influential concept of epistemic injustice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) has recently seen application to many areas of interest, with an increasing body of healthcare research using the concept of epistemic injustice in order to develop both general frameworks and accounts of specific medical conditions and patient groups. This paper illuminates tensions that arise between taking steps to protect against committing epistemic injustice in healthcare, and taking steps to understand the complexity of one's predicament and treat it accordingly. Work on epistemic injustice is therefore at risk of obfuscating legitimate and potentially fruitful inquiry. This paper uses Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis as a case study, but I suggest that the key problems identified could apply to other cases within healthcare, such as those classed as Medically Unexplained Illnesses, Functional Neurological Disorders and Psychiatric Disorders. Future work on epistemic injustice in healthcare must recognise and attend to this tension to protect against unsatisfactory attempts to correct epistemic injustice.

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