• J. Theor. Biol. · May 2010

    Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games.

    • Zhaojin Xu, Zhen Wang, and Lianzhong Zhang.
    • School of Science, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China.
    • J. Theor. Biol. 2010 May 7; 264 (1): 19-23.

    AbstractIt is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences how to maintain high levels of cooperation among selfish individuals. Theorists present an effective mechanism promoting cooperation by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. But Nash's theory predicts that no one can do better or worse than loners (players unwilling to join the public goods game) in the long run, and that the frequency of participants is independent of loners' payoff. In this paper, we introduce a degree of rationality and investigate the model by means of an approximate best response dynamics. Our research shows that the payoffs of the loners have a significant effect in anonymous voluntary public goods games by this introduction and that the dynamics will drive the system to a fixed point, which is different from the Nash equilibrium. In addition, we also qualitatively explain the existing experimental results.Copyright (c) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

      Pubmed     Full text   Copy Citation     Plaintext  

      Add institutional full text...

    Notes

     
    Knowledge, pearl, summary or comment to share?
    300 characters remaining
    help        
    You can also include formatting, links, images and footnotes in your notes
    • Simple formatting can be added to notes, such as *italics*, _underline_ or **bold**.
    • Superscript can be denoted by <sup>text</sup> and subscript <sub>text</sub>.
    • Numbered or bulleted lists can be created using either numbered lines 1. 2. 3., hyphens - or asterisks *.
    • Links can be included with: [my link to pubmed](http://pubmed.com)
    • Images can be included with: ![alt text](https://bestmedicaljournal.com/study_graph.jpg "Image Title Text")
    • For footnotes use [^1](This is a footnote.) inline.
    • Or use an inline reference [^1] to refer to a longer footnote elseweher in the document [^1]: This is a long footnote..

    hide…