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- Minus van Baalen and Vincent A A Jansen.
- Institut d'Ecologie, UMR 7625, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Bât. A, 7ème Etage CC237, 7 quai St Bernard, 75252 Paris Cedex 05, France. mvbaalen@snv.jussieu.fr
- Proc. Biol. Sci. 2003 Jan 7; 270 (1510): 69-76.
AbstractWe investigate how the evolution of communication strategies affects signal credibility when there is common interest as well as a conflict between communicating individuals. Taking alarm calls as an example, we show that if the temptation to cheat is low, a single signal is used in the population. If the temptation increases cheaters will erode the credibility of a signal, and an honest mutant using a different signal ('a private code') will be very successful until this, in turn, is cracked by cheaters. In such a system, signal use fluctuates in time and space and hence the meaning of a given signal is not constant. When the temptation to cheat is too large, no honest communication can maintain itself in a Tower of Babel of many signals. We discuss our analysis in the light of the Green Beard mechanism for the evolution of altruism.
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