• Doug Hardman and Phil Hutchinson.
• Department of Psychology, Faculty of Science and Technology, University of Bournemouth, Poole, UK.
• J Eval Clin Pract. 2023 Oct 1; 29 (7): 109510991095-1099.

AbstractBioethics seems preoccupied with establishing, debating, promoting and sometimes debunking principles. While these tasks trade on the status of the word 'principle' in our ordinary language, scant attention is paid to the way principles operate in language. In this paper, we explore how principles relate to rules and practices so as to better understand their logic. We argue that principles gain their sense and power from the practices which give them sense. While general principles can be, and are, establishable in abstraction from specific practices, as they are in principlist bioethics, such principles are impotent as moral guides to action. We show that the purchase any principle has as a moral guide to action emerges from its indexical properties as a principle which has sense in a specific practice. The meaning of any principle is internal to the practice and context in which it is invoked and, therefore, principles are not kinds of master rule which dictate moral judgement in new contexts but rather chameleon-like rules which change with the contexture in which they are invoked.© 2023 The Authors. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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