• Robert M Veatch.
• Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA. veatchr@georgetown.edu
• Death Stud. 2003 May 1;27(4):305-15.

AbstractIt seems generally correct that patients (or their valid surrogates) should be able to withdraw consent for the use of the total artificial heart (TAH) just as they presently may withdraw consent for other life-prolonging technologies such as the ventilator, but lingering moral problems remain with such decisions. First, should patients be permitted to demand actual removal of the TAH rather than mere deactivation? Second, foregoing other life-prolonging technologies is normally considered "indirect" killing and is therefore judged legal (as well as moral to those who accept only indirect killing). As long as the society includes irreversible stoppage of the heart as one of the criteria for death, however, stopping a TAH will be considered direct killing, i.e., murder. To circumvent this inconsistency, society must change its conclusion that stopping other life-prolonging technologies is merely indirect killing, explicitly legalize direct killing by means of stopping a TAH, or revisit the definition of death to eliminate the cardiac standard for death from the definition of death. Assuming that the stopping of the TAH with patient or surrogate consent is acceptable, we must then face the question of whether physicians who believe the TAH is serving no purpose can unilaterally stop the device against the wishes of a patient or surrogate who believes it is still serving a worthwhile purpose. Clinicians should be presumed authoritative in determining the predicted effect of the TAH, but, if the TAH can temporarily prolong life for a patient in a way that is desired by the patient or surrogate, case law, professional society recommendation, and moral analysis all support the conclusion that the TAH must be continued even against the conscientious objection of the physician

27 keywords...

hide…