Journal of medical ethics
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The article recently published in this journal by Dr B A Rix, a member of the Danish Council of Ethics (DCE), was heavily criticised by Dr David Lamb and Mr Christopher Pallis in subsequent commentaries. The editorial column by Professor Raanan Gillon also criticised the position put forward by Rix. In this article I contend that the definition of death put forward by Pallis and Lamb suffers certain philosophical shortcomings, that the position put forward by Rix deserves fuller consideration, and that Rix is not to be dismissed easily.
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The ordinary concept of death is analysed and compared with revisionary medical definitions, especially those based on irreversible loss of brain function. Prior critics of revisionary definitions have focused on the locus, the brain; I am concerned with the irreversibility condition. I argue that 1) the irreversibility condition is ambiguous, 2) it has unacceptable epistemic and other consequences on any plausible construal, and 3) irreversibility is not part of the ordinary concept of death. I conclude that recent medical definitions seek illegitimately to obtain the certainty of a weak construal of 'irreversible' along with the freedom from moral obligation of the strong construal.