Social science & medicine
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Social science & medicine · Aug 1998
Educational level and adult mortality in Russia: an analysis of routine data 1979 to 1994.
The investigation of socio-economic differences in mortality in Russia was effectively prohibited in the Soviet period. The extent and nature of any such differences is of considerable interest given the very different principles upon which Russian society has been organised for most of this century compared to the West where socio-economic differences in health have been extensively documented. Using cross-sectional data on mortality in Russia around the 1979 and 1989 Censuses, we have analysed mortality gradients according to length of education. ⋯ In this period there was a far weaker association between income and education than is seen in the West, suggesting that the education effects are unlikely to be driven by underlying differences in financial resources. The protective effect of education, in the Russian context at least, has been driven by more subtle and mechanisms. The apparent widening of socio-economic mortality differences since the collapse of the Soviet Union suggests that the transformation underway in Russian society requires a strengthening of the public health function.
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This comment is focused on the nature of the agency relationship between the physician and the patient. Beyond the discussion of the relative merits of the empowered physician versus empowered patient model. it is argued here that two features need to be integrated for an adequate account of this complex interaction: the two stages of the physician's action (the diagnosis and the treatment) and the physician's double agency (to the patient and to the representative of the collective interest).
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Social science & medicine · Aug 1998
The physician-patient encounter: the physician as a perfect agent for the patient versus the informed treatment decision-making model.
Assuming a goal of arriving at a treatment decision which is based on the physician's knowledge and the patient's preferences, we discuss the feasibility of implementing two treatment decision-making models: (1) the physician as a perfect agent for the patient, and (2) the informed treatment decision-making models. Both models fall under the rubric of agency models, however, the requirements from the physician and the patient are different. An important distinction between the two models is that in the former the patient delegates authority to her doctor to make medical decisions and thus the challenge is to encourage the physician to find out the patient's preferences. ⋯ We also argue that because better "technology" exists to transfer medical information to patients and time costs are involved in both tasks (i.e. transferring preferences or information), it is more feasible to design contracts to motivate physicians to transfer information to patients than to design contracts to motivate physicians to find out their patients' utility functions. We illustrate our arguments using a clinical example of the choice of adjuvant chemotherapy versus no adjuvant chemotherapy for women with early stage breast cancer. We also discuss issues relating to the current realities of clinical practice and their potential implications for the way that economists model physician-patient clinical encounters.