Emerging infectious diseases
-
Emerging Infect. Dis. · Jul 2012
Lessons learned from influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic response in Thailand.
In 2009, Thailand experienced rapid spread of the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. The national response came under intense public scrutiny as the number of confirmed cases and associated deaths increased. ⋯ However, areas needing improvement were surveillance, laboratory capacity, hospital infection control and surge capacity, coordination and monitoring of guidelines for clinical management and nonpharmaceutical interventions, risk communications, and addressing vulnerabilities of non-Thai displaced and migrant populations. The experience in Thailand may be applicable to other countries and settings, and the lessons learned may help strengthen responses to other pandemics or comparable prolonged public health emergencies.
-
Emerging Infect. Dis. · Jul 2012
Seroconversion to seasonal influenza viruses after A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection, Quebec, Canada.
We looked for cross-reactive antibodies in 122 persons with paired serum samples collected during the 2009 pandemic of influenza virus A(H1N1)pdm09. Eight (12%) of 67 persons with A(H1N1)pdm09 infection confirmed by reverse transcription PCR and/or serology also seroconverted to the seasonal A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1) virus, compared with 1 (2%) of 55 A(H1N1)pdm09-negative persons (p<0.05).
-
The revised International Health Regulations (IHR [2005]) conferred new responsibilities on member states of the World Health Organization, requiring them to develop core capacities to detect, assess, report, and respond to public health emergencies. Many countries have not yet developed these capacities, and poor understanding of the associated costs have created a barrier to effectively marshaling assistance. To help national and international decision makers understand the inputs and associated costs of implementing the IHR (2005), we developed an IHR implementation strategy to serve as a framework for making preliminary estimates of fixed and operating costs associated with developing and sustaining IHR core capacities across an entire public health system. This tool lays the groundwork for modeling the costs of strengthening public health systems from the central to the peripheral level of an integrated health system, a key step in helping national health authorities define necessary actions and investments required for IHR compliance.
-
Emerging Infect. Dis. · Jul 2012
Outbreak-associated Vibrio cholerae genotypes with identical pulsotypes, Malaysia, 2009.
A cholera outbreak in Terengganu, Malaysia, in November 2009 was caused by 2 El Tor Vibrio cholerae variants resistant to typical antimicrobial drugs. Evidence of replacement of treatable V. cholerae infection in the region with antimicrobial-resistant strains calls for increased surveillance and prevention measures.
-
The global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome highlighted the need to detect and control disease outbreaks at their source, as envisioned by the 2005 revised International Health Regulations (IHR). June 2012 marked the initial deadline by which all 194 World Health Organization (WHO) member states agreed to have IHR core capacities fully implemented for limiting the spread of public health emergencies of international concern. Many countries fell short of these implementation goals and requested a 2-year extension. ⋯ We developed concrete goals and metrics for 4 of the 8 core capacities with other US government partners in consultation with WHO and national collaborators worldwide. The intent is to offer an example of an approach to implementing and monitoring IHR for consideration or adaptation by countries that complements other frameworks and goals of IHR. Without concrete metrics, IHR may waste its considerable promise as an instrument for global health security against public health emergencies.