Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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Nineteenth-century American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce offered a picture of the scientific method that can be fruitfully applied to the practice of medical diagnosis. Physicians can use this framework to become more self-consciously aware of what they are doing when they diagnose medical conditions, and they can also learn more about the potential pitfalls of communication between physicians and their patients.
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This study examined the perspectives of 18 health care providers (nurses, consultant doctors, residents, radiologists, and physiotherapists) and 18 patients regarding best practices for patient-centred care (PCC) in a free private hospital in Pakistan, studying the congruence between provider and patient perspectives. ⋯ We recommend practices of PCC that are congruent with non-Western settings where religion and family play a primary role in matters dealing with patients' illnesses. Our findings suggest the need for recurrent training to improve teamwork among providers; questioning the implicit agreement of patients who may be vulnerable to decision making of authoritarian figures in their family; and the inclusion of peer-support workers or community health workers to offer aftercare support to patients in their home.
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Evidence-based medicine has claimed to be science on a number of occasions, but it is not clear that this status is deserved. Within the philosophy of science, four main theories about the nature of science are historically recognized: inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms, and research programmes. If evidence-based medicine is science, knowledge claims should be derived using a process that corresponds to one of these theories. ⋯ In the final section, possible counter arguments are considered. It is argued that the knowledge claims valued by evidence-based medicine are not justified using inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms, or research programmes. If these are the main criteria for evaluating if something is science or not, evidence-based medicine does not meet these criteria.
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This paper analyses the methods of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) for evaluating the carcinogenicity of various agents. I identify two fundamental evidential principles that underpin these methods, which I call Evidential Proximity and Independence. ⋯ I suggest a way to resolve this problem: admit a general exception to Independence and treat the implementation of Evidential Proximity more flexibly where this exception applies. I show that this suggestion is compatible with the general principles laid down in the 2019 version of IARC's methods guide, its Preamble to the Monographs.
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Evidence-based medicine (EBM) calls for medical practitioners to "integrate" our best available evidence into clinical practice. A significant amount of the literature on EBM takes this integration to be unproblematic, focusing on questions like how to interpret evidence and engage with patient values, rather than critically looking at how these features of EBM can be implemented together. ⋯ In particular, I introduce an epistemological issue for this integration problem, which I call the epistemic integration problem. This is essentially the problem of how we can use information that is both general (eg, about a population sample) and descriptive (eg, about what expected outcomes are) to reach clinical judgements that are individualized (applying to a particular patient) and normative (about what is best for their health).