Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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The language used in clinical practice is a key enabler to the success of treatment. Without good communication which is underpinned by values, therapeutic engagement and treatment outcomes will not be as successful.
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This study examined the perspectives of 18 health care providers (nurses, consultant doctors, residents, radiologists, and physiotherapists) and 18 patients regarding best practices for patient-centred care (PCC) in a free private hospital in Pakistan, studying the congruence between provider and patient perspectives. ⋯ We recommend practices of PCC that are congruent with non-Western settings where religion and family play a primary role in matters dealing with patients' illnesses. Our findings suggest the need for recurrent training to improve teamwork among providers; questioning the implicit agreement of patients who may be vulnerable to decision making of authoritarian figures in their family; and the inclusion of peer-support workers or community health workers to offer aftercare support to patients in their home.
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Nineteenth-century American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce offered a picture of the scientific method that can be fruitfully applied to the practice of medical diagnosis. Physicians can use this framework to become more self-consciously aware of what they are doing when they diagnose medical conditions, and they can also learn more about the potential pitfalls of communication between physicians and their patients.
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Evidence-based medicine has claimed to be science on a number of occasions, but it is not clear that this status is deserved. Within the philosophy of science, four main theories about the nature of science are historically recognized: inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms, and research programmes. If evidence-based medicine is science, knowledge claims should be derived using a process that corresponds to one of these theories. ⋯ In the final section, possible counter arguments are considered. It is argued that the knowledge claims valued by evidence-based medicine are not justified using inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms, or research programmes. If these are the main criteria for evaluating if something is science or not, evidence-based medicine does not meet these criteria.
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This paper analyses the methods of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) for evaluating the carcinogenicity of various agents. I identify two fundamental evidential principles that underpin these methods, which I call Evidential Proximity and Independence. ⋯ I suggest a way to resolve this problem: admit a general exception to Independence and treat the implementation of Evidential Proximity more flexibly where this exception applies. I show that this suggestion is compatible with the general principles laid down in the 2019 version of IARC's methods guide, its Preamble to the Monographs.