Hastings Cent Rep
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Consider any choice that affects some social policy. A decision that considers evidence will, at its heart, contain some kind of explicit or implicit "because" statement: "We are doing X because the evidence says Y." But can evidence ever truly speak for itself, in the sense of being reducible to objective utterances that are either correct or in need of correction? Before answering, consider what you'd prefer. Would you rather receive evidence that was free of any value judgments imposed by human actors, that was laden with value judgments that you agree with, or laden with value judgments that you disagree with? The central assertion of this essay is that, throughout policy analysis but especially in assessments of the costs and benefits of regulating versus encouraging new technologies (cost-benefit analysis, or CBA), the first possibility above is a mirage, and the second and third are self-contradictory. ⋯ The alternative judgments highlight the width of the spectrum of reasonable conclusions an analyst could reach merely by substituting other judgments for the ones currently embedded. Bringing hidden value judgments to light is doubly valuable. First, it allows discussion to ensue on a level playing field; instead of conclusory statements about what the evidence says, transparency permits statements taking the form of "when channeled through these value judgments, the evidence says this." Perhaps more importantly, transparency about value judgments permits participants in the discussions to offer interpretations of evidence contingent on there being different value judgments chosen at one or more points in the analysis, interpretations that may suggest that alternative course(s) of action are preferable to the one being championed.
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In the struggle over the durability of the Affordable Care Act, defenders of the ACA stand guard at many fronts. A major contribution of the ACA to nondiscrimination law, however, appears increasingly vulnerable. The ACA established significant new nondiscrimination protections for patients under section 1557 and its implementing regulations. ⋯ To evaluate these protections, we must consider not only their impacts on discriminatory behavior but also their behavioral and attitudinal impacts on patients and communities. This is because supportive or stigmatizing rules can exert an expressive effect: laws communicate information about prevailing social norms, they give some norms greater authority by virtue of the state's support, and they can shape community values. Through these expressive impacts, nondiscrimination laws may affect not only discriminatory behavior in health activities but also the attitudes, beliefs, and decisions of people who are legally protected.