• G J Chen and S R Feldman.
• Department of Public Health Sciences, Wake Forest University School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA. jchen@wfubmc.edu
• Dermatol Clin. 2000 Apr 1; 18 (2): 211-4.

AbstractEuropean health care delivery systems illustrate the effect of economic incentives on health care delivery. Each country faces the issue of trying to balance the desire for economic efficiency with comprehensive, quality medical care. Without careful use of economic incentives achievable with central control, one gets to pick only two of the three desired goods--high quality, low cost, and comprehensive coverage. In the United States, payment approaches for health care have been undergoing tremendous changes since the early 1980s. These changes have escalated during the 1990s. The basic approach for reimbursing hospital care has been completely restructured by many payers for care, and payment approaches for physicians and long-term care providers also are being restructured. Financing approaches vary from provider to provider and payer to payer, and financing approaches will continue to evolve over time. In the traditional fee-for-service reimbursement system, the incentive to physicians is to do more because more services lead to more revenue. The use of incentives to influence health care practitioners' behavior is common. Incentives are generally financial in nature and expose health care providers to some risk or reward for certain patterns of behavior. Some common incentives used in managed care include capitation payment, in which a physician is paid a fixed fee, regardless of the number of services administered; bonus distribution; and withhold accounts, through which a practitioner stands to gain or lose some amount of money for overuse or underuse of medical resources against budget. In many countries, a strengthening of the position of primary care providers can be observed: Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and now the United States. General practitioners are assumed to function as a gatekeeper to second-line care, such as specialist care, prescription drugs, and hospital care. A further step is to give the primary care providers financial responsibility for the costs of the follow-up care provided by others to their patients. By examining the health care systems of other countries, the potential negative impact of such an approach on the use of specialists can be seen. The negative impact of these approaches on patient care is clear when dermatologists and general practitioners are compared in the delivery of dermatologic health care.

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