The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care
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Multicenter Study Clinical Trial
Hospital costs for treatment of acute heart failure: economic analysis of the REVIVE II study.
Acute heart failure (AHF) is the leading cause of hospital admission among older Americans. The Randomized EValuation of Intravenous Levosimendan Efficacy (REVIVE II) trial compared patients randomly assigned to a single infusion of levosimendan (levo) or placebo (SOC), each in addition to local standard treatments for AHF. We report an economic analysis of REVIVE II from the hospital perspective. ⋯ In the REVIVE II trial, patients treated with levo had shorter LOS and lower cost for the initial hospital admission relative to patients treated with SOC. Based on sub-group analysis of patients administered per the current label, levo appears cost-effective relative to SOC.
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The potential of secondary prevention measures, such as cancer screening, to produce cost savings in the healthcare sector is a controversial issue in healthcare economics. Potential savings are calculated by comparing treatment costs with the cost of a prevention program. When survivors' subsequent unrelated health care costs are included in the calculation, however, the overall cost of disease prevention rises. ⋯ Beyond that age, the balance between a recipient's social security contributions and insurance system expenditure is negative. The paper clarifies the relevance of healthcare costs not related to the prevented disease to the economic evaluation of prevention programs, particularly in the case of fatal diseases such as colorectal cancer. The results of the study imply that, from an economic perspective, the participation of at-risk individuals in disease prevention programs should be promoted.
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The consequences of consumer-driven health care under different health insurance plans are studied by means of a game theoretic approach. Suitable demand-side cost-sharing can induce consumer behavior that avoids over-treatment when there are information asymmetries between providers and consumers, leading to the efficient recommendations and provision of treatment by providers. ⋯ The two models, however, yield higher welfare for consumers. Hence, the findings in this paper favor some amount of regulation in health-care markets.