Journal of personality and social psychology
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Randomized Controlled Trial Clinical Trial
Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: the role of emotion specificity.
Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson & A. ⋯ L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy.
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Counterfactual thinking is associated with regulatory focus in a way that explains previous empirical incongruities, such as whether additive counterfactuals (mutations of inactions) occur more or less frequently than subtractive counterfactuals (mutations of actions). In Experiment 1, regulatory focus moderated this pattern, in that additive counterfactuals were activated by promotion failure, whereas subtractive counterfactuals were activated by prevention failure. ⋯ In Experiment 3, dejection activated additive counterfactuals, whereas agitation activated subtractive counterfactuals. These findings illuminate the interconnections among counterfactual thinking, motivation, and goals.
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Randomized Controlled Trial Clinical Trial
Self-esteem and the cognitive accessibility of strengths and weaknesses after failure.
People with high self-esteem (HSEs) respond less negatively to failure than people with low self-esteem (LSEs). This difference may occur because HSEs overcome the natural tendency to focus on negative thoughts after failure, and instead focus on their strengths. In 2 experiments, participants with high and low self-esteem received failure, success, or no feedback. ⋯ This heightened discrepancy appears to result from HSEs recruiting their strengths and suppressing their weaknesses. In contrast, LSEs' weaknesses appeared to become especially accessible after failure. These results have implications for the mood-congruent cognition and self-esteem literatures.
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Choice, active response, self-regulation, and other volition may all draw on a common inner resource. In Experiment 1, people who forced themselves to eat radishes instead of tempting chocolates subsequently quit faster on unsolvable puzzles than people who had not had to exert self-control over eating. ⋯ In Experiment 4, an initial task requiring high self-regulation made people more passive (i.e., more prone to favor the passive-response option). These results suggest that the self's capacity for active volition is limited and that a range of seemingly different, unrelated acts share a common resource.
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If self-regulation conforms to an energy or strength model, then self-control should be impaired by prior exertion. In Study 1, trying to regulate one's emotional response to an upsetting movie was followed by a decrease in physical stamina. ⋯ In Study 4, autobiographical accounts of successful versus failed emotional control linked prior regulatory demands and fatigue to self-regulatory failure. A strength model of self-regulation fits the data better than activation, priming, skill, or constant capacity models of self-regulation.