Journal of cognitive neuroscience
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Impaired response inhibition is thought to be a core deficit in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Prior imaging studies investigating response inhibition in children with ADHD have used tasks involving different cognitive resources, thereby complicating the interpretation of their findings. In this study, a classical go/no-go task with a well-ingrained stimulus-response association (green = go; red = no-go) was used in order to minimize extraneous cognitive demands. ⋯ For "no-go" events, the children with ADHD demonstrated significantly less activation than did TD controls within a network important for inhibiting a motor response to a visual stimulus, with frontal differences localized to the pre-supplementary motor area. Although blood oxygenation level-dependent fMRI data show no differences between children with ADHD and TD children in association with a habituated motor "go" response, during "no-go" events, which require selecting not to respond, children with ADHD show diminished recruitment of networks important for response inhibition. The findings suggest that abnormalities in circuits important for motor response selection contribute to deficits in response inhibition in children with ADHD and lend support to the growing awareness of ADHD-associated anomalies in medial frontal regions important for the control of voluntary actions.
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Remembering and knowing are states of awareness that accompany the retrieval of facts, faces, and experiences from our past. Although originally intended to separate episodic from semantic memory, the dominant view today is that recollection-based decisions underlie remember responses, whereas familiarity-based decisions underlie know responses. Many functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies as well as lesion studies have relied on the remember/know procedure to identify the neural correlates of recollection and familiarity. ⋯ Critically, this held true even when the source decision was made before the old/new decision (i.e., even after successful recollection had just occurred). Our results show that although recollection and familiarity may be different processes, the remember/know paradigm does not probe them directly. As such, dissociations involving remember/know judgments in fMRI studies and in studies involving amnesic patients should not be construed as dissociations between recollection and familiarity.