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- Michael C M Leung.
- School of Public Health, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong. b578769@cuhk.edu.hk
- Eur J Health Econ. 2010 Apr 1;11(2):161-75.
AbstractThe consequences of consumer-driven health care under different health insurance plans are studied by means of a game theoretic approach. Suitable demand-side cost-sharing can induce consumer behavior that avoids over-treatment when there are information asymmetries between providers and consumers, leading to the efficient recommendations and provision of treatment by providers. If under-treatment can be penalized, then a full insurance model that pays providers a fixed salary and fee-for-service or one that requires patients to present a referral letter before specialist care is delivered also achieves provision efficiency. The two models, however, yield higher welfare for consumers. Hence, the findings in this paper favor some amount of regulation in health-care markets.
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